Financing Big US Federal Expenditures Surges: COVID-19 and Earlier US Wars *

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June 12, 2022

Abstract

Directed by a consolidated government budget constraint, we compare US monetary-fiscal responses to World Wars I and II, and the War on COVID-19 with responses to the War of Independence, the War of 1812, and the Civil War.

KEYWORDS: Inflation, tax-smoothing, assumption, default.

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*We thank conference participants and our discussant Ellen McGrattan for suggestions and questions. We especially thank Michael Bordo, James Bullard, John Cochrane, and Patrick Kehoe for their probing questions.

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1 Introduction

The first part of this chapter summarizes [Hall and Sargent (2022)], a pattern recognition exercise in which we described similarities and differences between how the US government financed its war on COVID-19 and how it financed World War I and World War II. We asked, who paid for each of these three wars? Was it taxpayers? Bondholders? Money holders? The second part of the chapter consists of additional historical evidence that helps to answer some of the probing questions we received from conference participants. To assemble our answers, we rely heavily on findings reported in [Hall and Sargent (2014, 2019, 2021)] and [Sargent (2012)]. Throughout the chapter, we use a consolidated government budget constraint as our organizing principle. Data visualization and tabular summaries are our principal techniques. We organize data as though they conform to a “common stochastic trends” process of a type presented by [Hansen (2012)] and applied to asset pricing by [Hansen and Scheinkman (2009)]. Thus, our main tools for pre-processing the data are taking logs and their differences. As promised by [Hansen (2012)], these transformations uncover apparently stationary statistical behavior lurking within a suite of randomly growing time series. Thus, see our figures 2 and 9 below, which serve as virtual poster children for a [Barro (1979)] tax-smoothing model.

2 World Wars I and II and the War on COVID-19

We start with some similar private sector patterns across World War I, World War II, and the War on COVID-19. First, the War on COVID-19, like World War I and World War II, was a worldwide adverse shock. Second, all three wars were large shocks to the civilian workforce. In World Wars I and II, the government paid and in many cases, drafted men to leave the civilian workforce and join the military. During COVID-19, the government paid people to leave the civilian workforce and stay home to slow the spread of the virus. Third, domestic and international travel and trade were sharply curtailed during all three of these wars.

In figure 1, we ask what percentages of the working age population were removed from the civilian workforce during these wars? The blue line plots active duty military as a percent of the total population, and the red line plots the share of the population receiving unemployment insurance. The figure illustrates that 3% of the population was in active duty military during World War I. This share rose to 8.5% during World War II. During COVID-19, 7% of the working-age population was receiving unemployment insurance.
Next, we discuss a few public sector patterns. Consider figure 2. The blue line is government expenditures, and the red line is tax revenues, both as a share of GDP. Government spending in the 20th-century world wars had both temporary and permanent components.

- Perhaps the most striking feature of this figure is the three spikes in expenditures for World War I, World War II, and COVID-19. While expenditures rose sharply during these wars, tax revenues rose by only a fraction of the total expenditures on the war. This pattern suggests that those wars were partly financed by interest-bearing debt and base money. For COVID-19, tax revenue barely budged, indicating that nearly all war costs were covered by the issuance of interest-bearing debt and base money.

- Immediately after World War I and World War II, both expenditures and tax revenue fell, but notably, after both of these wars, the government ran primary surpluses, implying that a portion of the wartime debt was repaid quickly. For the post-COVID-19 period, we anticipate a decade of primary deficits – not surpluses. The four major federal spending packages of 2020 and 2021 in response to COVID-19 authorized increases in spending for the next several years. The gold and purple lines plot our forecasts of outlays and tax revenues for the next ten years based on CBO projections. In sharp contrast to the post-World War I and World War II periods, in the post-COVID period, outlays are expected to exceed tax revenue for at least ten years.

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1The CARES Act (signed into law on March 27, 2020); The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021 (signed December 27, 2020); The American Rescue Plan (signed March 11, 2021); and The Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (signed November 15, 2021).
Figure 2: U.S. Federal Government Expenditures and Receipts: 1900-2031

Outlays are net of official interest payments. 1900-2010 annual by fiscal year; 2011-present monthly data aggregated to 6-month periods. Outlays and Receipts from 2022-2031 are computed using CBO projections.

- After World War I and World War II, expenditures fell, but they did not fall back to their prewar levels. Thus, the government grew as a share of GDP after each war. Based on CBO projections of spending and GDP growth, we anticipate the same after the War on COVID-19.

- Finally, note that the federal government’s response to the Great Recession of 2008 looks similar in magnitude as a share of GDP to its response to the Great Depression in the 1930s.

As we noted in figure 2, each of these three world wars was financed in part by issuing interest-bearing debt. In figure 3 we plot US Treasury debt as a percent of GDP and decompose it by ownership. In all three of these wars, Treasury debt increased dramatically and quickly. But the ownership of the debt varied considerably across World War I, World War II, and COVID-19. During World War I, nearly all of the debt was held by domestic private investors (in blue). Fast forward to 2021 – as a very rough approximation – about a fifth of the debt is held by the Fed Reserve (in purple); about a fifth is held by government agencies and trust funds (in yellow); about a quarter is held by foreign investors (in brown); and about a third is held by domestic private investors. Today, a wider range of investors hold the debt than in previous wars.

Table 1 reports some of the numbers behind the data plotted in figure 3. As noted by other authors in this volume, in 2020 and 2021, the Treasury issued about $6.4 trillion in new debt. How did this debt get absorbed? The Federal Reserve increased its holding of US Treasury debt by about $3.3 trillion, or 51% of the increase in total debt outstanding. Domestic private investors
Figure 3: Par Value of US Treasury Debt by Ownership as a Percent of GDP: 1900 to 2021

Table 1: Treasury Debt Ownership at Starts and Ends of Three Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>Federal Reserve</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>$0.3115</td>
<td>$2.80</td>
<td>$19.41</td>
<td>$2,303.5</td>
<td>$5,580.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+0.312</td>
<td>+16.61</td>
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<td>Gov’t Agencies and Trust Funds</td>
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<td>31.88</td>
<td>6,030.9</td>
<td>6,473.5</td>
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<td>+25.33</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Investors</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>6,844.2</td>
<td>7,739.4</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+895.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Private Investors</td>
<td>1.1893</td>
<td>20.6574</td>
<td>31.51</td>
<td>224.42</td>
<td>8,045.2</td>
<td>9,824.3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>+19.468</td>
<td>+192.91</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>$1.1893</td>
<td>$21.0759</td>
<td>$40.86</td>
<td>$278.11</td>
<td>$23,223.8</td>
<td>$29,617.2</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+19.887</td>
<td>+237.25</td>
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<td></td>
<td>+6,393.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The debt is measured at its par value in billions of nominal dollars. The number below and center is the change in the debt holding for each ownership class. Treasury records on holdings by foreign investors begin December 1939.
increased their holdings by about $1.8 trillion, or about 28% of the total increase in US Treasury debt.

Next, we turn to the Federal Reserve System. During all three of these wars, the Federal Reserve supported the US Treasury market, and as a consequence of this support, expanded its balance sheet. In figure 4 we display the balance sheets of the Federal Reserve with assets on the left and liabilities on the right.

Panels 4a and 4b report the Fed balance sheet during the period around World War I. The first thing to note is that the balance sheet expanded dramatically during the war. The Federal Reserve did purchase outright Treasury securities, chiefly the Liberty Loans. In the asset graph, these purchases are denoted by the green area, but note this green area is quite small. The primary way that the Federal Reserve supported the US Treasury market was by making loans to banks at preferred interest rates. If those loans were used to purchase Liberty Loans, the Fed would hold those Liberty Loans as collateral on its balance sheet. The yellow area in the asset panel denotes these bonds held as collateral.

How did the Federal Reserve raise the funds to make these loans? On the liability side of its balance sheet, we see that currency outstanding (in green) rose, as did bank reserves at the Federal Reserve (in yellow). Of course, currency plus reserves is the monetary base. So the answer is: by expanding the monetary base.

During World War II, the Federal Reserve purchased outright US Treasury securities on a large scale. These purchases are depicted by the green area of the panel 4c. As a consequence of the Treasury’s wartime policy of a fixed upward-sloping yield curve during World War II, private investors perceived little or no interest rate risk. Hence, private investors largely concentrated their purchases in longer-term notes and bonds. This left the Federal Reserve to concentrate most of its holdings in short-term treasury bills and certificates of indebtedness.

Again how did the Fed pay for its support of the Treasury market? As before in World War I, looking at the liability side of the balance sheet in panel 4d we see increases in both currency outstanding (in green) and bank reserves at the Federal Reserve (in yellow).

As others at this conference have noted and as we have discussed above, the Federal Reserve in 2020 and 2021 purchased $3.3 trillion in US Treasury securities (in green) and purchased over $1 trillion in private assets, primarily mortgage backed securities (in brown), as shown in panel 4e. How did the Fed pay for these purchases? Once again, by increasing currency (in green) and by increasing bank reserves at the Federal Reserve (in yellow) as denoted in the panel 4f. But unlike during the previous two world wars, the Fed also issued reverse repurchase agreements (in red) partly to increase liquidity in key markets, particularly the money market mutual fund market.

There are two other differences between the COVID-19 and World War II periods. First, during the current COVID-19 period, much of the Feds holdings were weighted toward the longer-term notes and bonds. In contrast, during World War II, the Feds holdings were concentrated
Figure 4: Federal Reserve Balance Sheets During Three Wars
mainly in shorter-term securities. Second, since 2008, the Federal Reserve has paid interest on bank reserves and the reverse repurchase agreements (reverse repos). So we ask whether we should include these bank reserves and reverse repos as part of the money supply or whether they belong as part of the interest-bearing debt of the federal government?

The analytical core of our paper is a decomposition of revenues for the three world wars. Before doing this decomposition, we make adjustments to the Treasury data to bring it in line with economic theory. The first adjustment is to net out debt held by the Federal Reserve and government agencies. That is, we want to record just the debt owned by private investors, both domestic and private. The second adjustment is to measure the debt at its market value instead of its par value. In figure 5, we plot the market value of the Treasury debt held by private investors as a share of GDP (in blue) and the corresponding par value (in red). These two series track each other quite closely, but they deviate at times of fiscal stress.

We note again that since 2008 the Fed has paid interest on bank reserves and reverse repos. If we add those two private sector claims on the Fed to our stock of interest-bearing debt, we get the green line. Interestingly, this summation brings the debt to GDP ratio to nearly 100%. Of course, the Fed used some of these bank reserves to purchase private assets; subtracting these asset purchases from the total debt yields the series plotted in light blue.

Our third adjustment is to interest payments. Instead of using the accounting measure re-
ported by the federal government, we measure interest payments by the ex post holding period returns earned by bondholders to take into account the capital gains and losses that John Cochrane discussed earlier this morning.

Our revenue decomposition is based on the period-by-period consolidated government budget constraint stated in equation \(1\). On the left side of this equation are expenditures; on the right side are revenues.

\[
G_t + r_{t-1,t}B_{t-1} + (A_t - A_{t-1}) = T_t + (B_t - B_{t-1}) + r_{t-1,t}^A A_{t-1} + (M_t - M_{t-1}) + OM_t
\]

where

\[
G_t = \text{Government outlays (net of official interest payments)}
\]

\[
B_{t-1} = \text{Nominal market value of interest-bearing government debt held by private investors at the end of } t - 1
\]

\[
r_{t-1,t}^B = \text{Nominal value-weighted holding period return on government debt between } t - 1 \text{ and } t
\]

\[
A_t = \text{Private assets purchased by the Federal Reserve}
\]

\[
r_{t-1,t}^A = \text{Nominal holding period return on Fed-held private assets between } t - 1 \text{ and } t
\]

\[
T_t = \text{Tax receipts}
\]

\[
M_t = \text{Federal Reserve credit}
\]

\[
OM_t = \text{Funding by Other Means}
\]

Funding by Other Means includes dollar deposits with and letters of credit to the IMF, changes in special drawing rights certificates issued to Federal Reserve Banks, and net activity of various loan financing activities.

We divide each term in equation \(1\) by nominal GDP and rearrange the term. Doing so, yields equation \(2\)

\[
\frac{G_t}{Y_t} + \left( r_{t-1,t}^B \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - r_{t-1,t}^A \frac{A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \right) + \left( \frac{A_t}{Y_t} - \frac{A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \right) = \frac{T_t}{Y_t} + \left( \frac{B_t}{Y_t} - \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \right) + \frac{M_t - M_{t-1}}{Y_t} + \frac{OM_t}{Y_t} + g_{t-1,t} \frac{B_{t-1} - A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \left( \pi_{t-1,t} - \frac{B_{t-1} - A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \right) + \frac{OM_t}{Y_t} + g_{t-1,t} \frac{B_{t-1} - A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \left( \pi_{t-1,t} + g_{t-1,t} \right) \left( r_{t-1,t}^B \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} - r_{t-1,t}^A \frac{A_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} \right)
\]

where \(g_{t-1,t}\) denotes the net growth rate of real GDP and \(\pi_{t-1,t}\) denotes the net inflation rate. As before, expenditures are to the left of the equal sign and revenues are to the right.

For each term in equation \(2\) we compute the average of the five years of observations before the war and use this value as a counterfactual; that is, it is our estimate of what the series would have been had the war not occurred. We call this the “peacetime baseline.” We then sum up the differences between the observed series and the peacetime baseline. We do this term by term for
every term in equation 2.

Table 2 reports the results of this decomposition. Consider World War I. The decomposition finds that for the two years that the US was involved in World War I, it spent 36.93\% of a single year’s GDP on the war. It paid its bondholders 3/10 of 1\% of a year’s worth of GDP. It purchased private assets of 16/100 of one percent of a year’s worth of GDP, bringing the total cost of the war to 37.39\% of a year’s worth of GDP. How did the US government pay for this? We decompose revenue raised into tax revenue, debt growth, money growth, GDP growth, inflation, and everything else. The terms in columns (5) through (10) sum to 37.39.

It may be more intuitive to look at the second row for each war, which reports the revenue sources as percentages of the total. How did the US finance its spending on World War I? The answer is 20.8\% through raising taxes; 74.3\% through issuing interest-bearing debt; and 6.9\% through increases in the monetary base, with a residual of -2.0\% explained by the remaining terms.

For the War on COVID-19, the US government spent 21.37\% of a year’s worth of GDP to fight the virus in 2020 and 2021. The government paid its bondholders 2/10 of 1\% of a year’s worth of GDP, and the Federal Reserve purchased the assets of 5.85\% of a year’s worth of GDP. Summing these terms brings the total cost of the war to 27\% of a year’s worth of GDP.

How did the government pay for this spending? Increased tax revenue made up a mere 3.5\% of the war payments. Debt growth is negative. Why is this? In the five years prior to COVID-19, the federal government ran large deficits, issuing debt that was primarily purchased by private investors rather than the Federal Reserve. The decomposition expects that this trend would have continued had COVID-19 not occurred. Thus, the decomposition implies that nearly all of the cost of COVID-19 – 91.7\% – was financed by money growth.

As we noted earlier, some of the components of this newly-created “money” paid interest, so we repeat the decomposition counting bank reserves at the Federal Reserve and the reverse repos as part of the stock of interest-bearing debt. If we do so, we shift about 70\% of the revenues from the money growth category to interest-bearing debt. Thus, the cost of this most recent war was split: 3.5\% by tax revenue, 67\% by interest-bearing debt, and 18.5\% by money growth.

Comparing the revenue decomposition across all three wars, we see that increases in tax revenues covered 20.8\% of the cost of World War I, 30.2\% of the cost of World War II, and only 3.5\% of the War on COVID-19. Money growth covered 6.9\% of the cost of World War I, 10.1\% of the cost of World War II, and 18.5\% of the cost of the War on COVID-19.

What impact did this money growth have on prices? In figure 6, we plot the log of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) normalized to be 0 at the start of each war. Looking at the red line, we see that six years after the start of World War I, the CPI was 70\% higher than it was in 1914. Then the US experienced two years of deflation. But by eight years after the war, the price level was

\footnote{This represents actual spending – not just the authorizations.}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Start - End</th>
<th>(1) government spending</th>
<th>(2) payouts on net debt</th>
<th>(3) asset purchases</th>
<th>(4) (1)+(2)</th>
<th>(5) tax revenue</th>
<th>(6) debt growth</th>
<th>(7) money growth</th>
<th>(8) GDP growth</th>
<th>(9) inflation</th>
<th>(10) Other</th>
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<td>World War I</td>
<td>1917:4 - 1918:11</td>
<td>36.93</td>
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<td>0.16</td>
<td>37.39</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>27.79</td>
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<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.68</td>
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<td>20.8</td>
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<td>6.9</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
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<td>2.00</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>118.48</td>
<td>35.80</td>
<td>54.53</td>
<td>11.96</td>
<td>8.99</td>
<td>6.05</td>
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<td>30.2</td>
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<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
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<td>21.37</td>
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<td>27.45</td>
<td>0.95</td>
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<td>1.02</td>
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<td></td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>-2.2</td>
<td>91.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>11.0</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2020:1 - 2021:12</td>
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<td>67.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>-8.9</td>
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Table 2: Decomposition of Wartime Revenues from Equation (2)

For each war, the elements in first row are in percent of GDP. Columns 5-10 sum to column 4. The numbers in the second row are percentages of the sum of war-related spending, net debt payments and purchases of private assets (column 4) accounted for by each term on the right side of equation (2). Column 10 is the sum of other means, the cross product, and a residual. See the appendix for the definition of $M$. 
still 55 to 60% higher than it was at the start of the war.

For World War II, we see a similar pattern. Prices rose early in the war, but price and wage controls dampened rates of increase in the CPI. When the federal government lifted these controls in 1946, prices jumped. As was the case after World War I, eight years after the war, the price level was 55 to 60% higher than before the war. Today, we have only two years and five months of price data for the War on COVID-19 period. But prices during this period, plotted in blue, track the price increases from two previous wars.

How did bondholders do after each war? Not well. In figure 7, we plot the real (inflation-adjusted) value of $100 invested in a representative value-weighted portfolio of US Treasury securities in which the coupon and principal payments are continually reinvested. The red and gold lines represent the values of this representative portfolio during and after World War I and World War II, respectively. Both lines are near mirror images of the normalized price levels plotted in figure 6. Six years after the start of World War I, the value of that portfolio was 50% of what it was at the beginning of the war. During and after World War II, once again, bondholders did poorly. Price controls mitigated these losses, but bondholders received a large capital loss.

3One of those bondholders was Army Captain Harry Truman. He never forgot these losses. One of the reasons why the Korean War was tax financed was that President Harry Truman argued that wartime inflation was due to “our failure to tax enough.” (Truman 1951)
Figure 7: Real Values of $100 Portfolio of Treasury Securities Invested at the Starts of World War I, World War II, and the War on COVID-19.

This figure reports the cumulative real values coming from continually reinvesting in a value-weighted re-balanced portfolio of all outstanding US Treasury securities of an initial investment of $100 at the start of each war. Ticks on the x-axis correspond to January for the 1914 to 1926 period and March for the 1939 to 1951 period. For the COVID-19 War, the series begins January 2020 and ends December 2021.

Once price controls were released. As John Cochrane pointed out at the conference, these losses were transfers from the bondholders to the taxpayer. The blue line represents the value of the representative portfolio during the War on COVID-19. In the two years since this war began, the portfolio’s value tracked the values during the previous two world wars.

3 More History

In the remainder of this chapter we describe historical precedents that shaped how 20th century policy makers framed decisions. Responses to the enormous disruptions associated with World War I did not start from a blank slate. Decision makers remembered how governments had coped during earlier wars, for example, in the United Kingdom during and after the wars from 1792 to 1815 against France, and in the United States during and after the Civil War. Those experiences had shaped a conventional wisdom about how to finance wars and how to manipulate returns on government debts through price level adjustments that could be engineered by temporarily suspending convertibility of government notes into gold but eventually resuming convertibility at prewar rates of exchange. Thus, an issue that confronted many countries after World War I was how to reconstruct a prewar gold standard. That same problem had also been faced in the 19th
century. UK monetary-fiscal authorities after 1815 had awarded high real returns to government creditors by presiding over a fall in the price level sufficient to allow the Bank of England in 1821 to make its notes convertible into gold once again at the same rate that had been maintained before convertibility was suspended in 1797. US monetary-fiscal authorities did something similar after the US Civil War ended in 1865. Greenback dollars issued by the Union during the dark days of the Civil War at big discounts relative to gold dollars were ultimately made convertible into gold one-for-one starting in January 1879. Authors of these policies wanted wartime suspensions of convertibility to be temporary because they wanted markets to infer that future suspensions would also be temporary. Subsequent monetary and fiscal decision makers praised those episodes for fostering expectations among creditors that public debts would be honored, thus enhancing the marketability of public debts and providing future government officials opportunities to borrow at the low interest rates brought about by low default probabilities.

Digging deeper reveals that post-US Civil War debt repayment and currency policies emerged only after bitterly contested political struggles that had pitted the interests of government creditors against the interests of both taxpayers and the private borrowers who had issued bonds dominated in paper units of account. Those disputes probably taught post-World War I policymakers that the foundations of the conventional wisdom were fragile and subject to substantial political risks.

Various conference participants raised questions about how a monetary authority, or consolidated fiscal-monetary authority, acquires credibility. The idea that a government earns a reputation as a trustworthy creditor by honoring promises to award high returns to government creditors has been treated well by modern theories of how sovereign debts are valued and optimally managed. Theories of sovereign and domestic government debts are driven by assumptions about consequences of paying and defaulting, consequences that are affected by and feedback on how government deficits are chosen. Outcomes hinge on assumptions regarding consequences of defaults and about incentives to repay.

3.1 Distinguishing between money and bonds

Since the beginning of the Republic, US policy makers have thought hard about how to design evidences of Federal debt. Attitudes about “bonds versus money” evolved during the first century under the Constitution of 1789, as conflicting interests and theories interacted with a string of experiences. These formed the background for policy debates that were precursors to contemporary discussions of whether and how to pay interest on reserves. A fascinating drama unfolded entailing actions designed at first to poison, then to restore, and ultimately to sustain expectations that the US federal government’s paper IOU’s were as good as gold.

At the conference, Patrick Kehoe and Elena Pastorini wanted evidence about the social process that allows a monetary-fiscal authority to acquire and sustain a reputation.
As a preview of the outcomes, notice the large gaps between the market and par values of US government debt plotted in figure 8. Starting in 1775 with the issuance of the Continental Government’s Loan Office Certificates until the end of James Madison’s Administration in 1817, US government debt traded at a deep discount relative to its par value. Further, note that beginning in the late 1860s, the market value of the debt exceeded the par value. Now contrast the large deviations between the market and par values observed in the 18th and 19th centuries with the relatively minor deviations observed in the 20th century plotted in figure 5.

In 1790, the framers of the U.S. federal government debated whether and how to discriminate the rates of return given to U.S. creditors. James Madison wanted to allocate payoffs among current and former bondholders in ways that would withhold capital gains from more recent purchasers and compensate former holders who had experienced capital losses from selling their bonds. Alexander Hamilton (1790) opposed Madison’s discrimination scheme because of its adverse effects on the expectations of prospective government creditors. Hamilton criticized Madison’s proposal, first, because it would defeat Hamilton’s goal of fostering a liquid market in U.S. government bonds, and, second, because it would inappropriately reward former holders of government bonds who, by selling, had bet against the credit of the U.S.; it would also unfairly punish current holders who, by buying, had expressed their confidence in U.S. credit.

Hamilton won that argument and Congress did not implement Madison’s particular version of a discrimination scheme. But it did discriminate. In particular, in following Hamilton’s recommendations about how to restructure U.S. and state debts in 1790, Congress discriminated among
creditor classes in ways that was designed intentionally to poison the U.S. government’s reputation for servicing some types of debt (the despised paper money known then as “bills of credit”) while simultaneously enhancing its reputation for servicing other types of debt (interest-bearing medium and long term obligations, especially to foreign creditors).

U.S. fiscal authorities’ propensity to discriminate was destined gradually to diminish over time, a pattern revealed in how the United States financed its expenditures during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Civil War. During all three wars, the federal government and the states issued debts that differed in their maturities, denominations, and units of account. A theoretical contribution of Bryant and Wallace (1984) explains why federal and state governments might have wanted to award different rates of return to different classes of government creditors. Bryant and Wallace showed how such price discrimination can improve fiscal efficiency.

The units of account in which government debts can be expressed and enforced are central to a price-discrimination analysis of monetary and fiscal policy. Bryant and Wallace in effect assumed that a government can issue some securities that are expressed in a foreign government’s unit of account or otherwise indexed against domestic inflation, and that it can issue other securities that are not.

Whether units of account should be arranged in this way is an issue that underlies a fascinating story, namely the evolution of U.S. government officials’ opinions about whether they should, or even legally could, issue small denomination zero-interest notes (paper money) and whether they should declare those notes legal tender for public and private debts. James Madison thought that making paper money a leading tender was reprehensible, while Ulysses S. Grant thought that it was useful. But making U.S. paper money a legal tender meant something different to James Madison in 1787 or 1813 than it did to Ulysses S. Grant in 1869. In 1787 and 1790, issuing paper money portended depreciation and repudiation. In 1869 and 1870, when the Congress and the President took actions to make U.S. issued paper money as good as gold, paper money meant appreciation and resumption.

We can summarize the main features of this story as follows. The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from issuing bills of credit; during the 1790s federal issues of bills of credit, though not explicitly prohibited, were widely regarded as bad. There was also a broad sentiment against making anything other than specie a legal tender. Madison thought that denying legal tender status to a government issued paper money was a good way to limit its capacity to damage credit markets. Alexander Hamilton’s restructuring of federal and state government’s debt harshly discriminated against continental bills of credit. That saved federal tax revenues. And by impairing their reputation, it also had the salutary effect of discouraging future issues of federal bills of credit.

Despite that history, on February 25, 1862 the Union made greenbacks a legal tender for
all private debts and some public obligations, an act hotly disputed at the time. In 1869 the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the act that made greenbacks a legal tender. Soon thereafter President Grant appointed two new justices who concurred in the Court’s quick reversal of that earlier decision, thereby affirming that the federal government was empowered to make a paper fiduciary currency a legal tender. Instead of unleashing an era of high inflation fueled by government printing of paper money, President Grant and the Congress presided over an appreciation of the greenback that awarded people who held them higher returns than those who, when Union Armies had suffered setbacks, had speculated against the greenback. In 1790, people deplored federal paper money as “not worth a continental”; after 1879, people trusted greenbacks to be small denomination warehouse certificates for gold. Reputational considerations were very much on the minds of public officials in both periods.

3.1.1 Tax smoothing

We received questions about how our analysis relates to leading “tax smoothing” models. Our figure prompted such questions because it reminded some conference participants of a computer simulation of a Barro (1979) tax smoothing model. Figure here confirms that 19th century US observations look like that too. That pattern reflects that Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin (1837) can be credited as an early co-author of the Barro model, and that subsequent administrations and Congresses adhered to Gallatin’s advice.

Hamilton (1790) and the Congress rescheduled Continental and state obligations in ways that they hoped would give the federal government sustained access to domestic and international credit markets. That would expand the Federal government’s subsequent options for financing temporary surges in government expenditures by borrowing, thereby allowing it to moderate the contemporary tax increases needed to finance those surges. This part of Federalist policy was embraced and extended by the Jefferson administration when it took office in 1801. In his 1807 report to Congress, Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin (1837) used a line of reasoning that contains all of the components of a normative model of fiscal policy later formalized in models of Barro (1979) and Aiyagari et al. (2002). Gallatin’s report recommended that tax rates should be set to “provide a revenue at least equal to the annual expenses on a peace establishment, the interest on the existing debt, and the interest on the loans which may be raised. ... losses and privations caused by war should not be aggravated by taxes beyond what is strictly necessary.” Gallatin (1837)p.360]. Thus, Gallatin proposed that the best way to pay for a surge in government expenditures would be temporarily to borrow during the surge, to increase taxes permanently by enough to service the resulting debt, and after the expenditure surge had ended, to run a net of interest surplus sufficiently large to roll over the debt. Like Hamilton, Gallatin’s presumption was that the debt would surely be serviced as promised, and that a good fiscal policy would adjust
Figure 9: U.S. Federal Government Expenditures and Receipts: 1775-1900

Outlays are net of official interest payments. During Civil War, GDP includes the Confederacy.

Figure 10: Primary Deficit: 1775-1900

During the Civil War, GDP includes the Confederacy.
net of interest surpluses required to service the debt to smooth tax distortions over time.

U.S. fiscal authorities embraced Gallatin’s model throughout the nineteenth century. Gallatin
and his successors presumed, and wanted markets to presume, that U.S. government debts would
always be paid in a timely manner; they promoted expectations that no circumstances would be
offered as excuses for failures to pay. Essentially, they proposed to use risk-free government debt
to smooth tax distortions across time and they sought to sustain a reputation that their debt
would be risk-free. They would smooth tax distortions across contingencies only to the extent
that risk-free debt allowed them effectively to “self-insure” fluctuating government expenditures.

3.2 To buy insurance against expenditure risk or to self-insure?

Some conference participants asked as about the applicability of the model. In the representative agent Ramsey models of , a government optimally finances a stochastic stream of exogenous government expenditures by trading state-contingent claims with the private sector. The government thereby enters into a complete risk-sharing scheme with the private sector that allows it to smooth tax distortions across time and across random histories of government expenditures. and show that if the government does not have access to complete insurance markets but can issue only risk-free nominal bonds, then it can achieve the same equilibrium outcomes by using history-contingent inflation and deflation to award real capital losses and gains to holders of government bonds. Here, denominating risk-free bonds in a nominal unit of account, then making nominal values respond appropriately to random shocks to government expenditures, are parts of an optimal fiscal and monetary policy. used this logic to argue against “dollarization” schemes because they prevent sovereign governments from reaping the benefits that flow from using inflation to award history-contingent returns to government creditors.

Early American policy makers did not see it Sims’s way. Influenced by the repudiation of the Continents, they saw inflation as a deplorable way of abrogating contracts, not implementing a well understood risk-sharing scheme between the government and the private sector. For more than eighty years after 1790, most American statesmen denied that there were benefits to be reaped by denominating government debt contracts, and forcing citizens to denominate theirs, in a nominal unit of account other than specie. This drove their hostility to making a Federal paper money a legal tender.

3.3 The Civil War

Union expenditures during the Civil War were unprecedented, generating four years of budget deficits over 8% of GDP. See figures and and compare the magnitudes of the Civil War deficits to the 2% of GDP deficits during the War of 1812. In response to the sudden increase in needed
funds, Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase initially relied heavily on short-term borrowing. Much of this short-term debt was in the form of three-year “7-30s”, Treasury notes paying an interest rate of 7.3%.\footnote{\cite{Remnants of hard money Jackson Democrats had long regarded the Whig Party as soft on paper money. Remnants of the Whig Party formed the backbone of the Republican party. Did this history bequeath a credibility problem to the new Lincoln administration in March 1861? Maybe. But, anticipating an idea of \cite{Rogoff (1985) that you can resist a temptation to inflate by strategically delegating monetary policy to an inflation hawk, Lincoln appointed as his Secretary of Treasury Salmon P. Chase, Governor of Ohio, formerly a Jackson hard money Democrat and a future Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. A decade later Chase would write the Supreme Court decision that declared unconstitutional Congress’s 1862 action that awarded legal tender status to the paper money called greenbacks that he, as Secretary of Treasury, had issued to help pay for the war. The Congress had made them legal tender for all debts public and private, except payment of customs duties, the lion’s share of Federal Revenues. The legal tender clause created many winners (debtors who owed dollars) and losers (creditors in dollars). See \cite{Lowenstein (2022) for much more about these events.} Lowenstein (2022) presents a fascinating account of the log-rolling process that designed the 5-20’s. It sheds light on the political coalitions supporting many features of the 5-20’s, but not the ambiguity about units of account for repayment of principal.}

\begin{table}
\centering
\begin{tabular}{cccccccccc}
\hline

War & Start - End & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(1)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(2)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(3)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(4)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(5)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(6)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(7)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(8)} & \multicolumn{2}{c}{(9)} \\

& & govt’ return & total & tax & debt & money & GDP & inflation & other \\

spending & on debt & spending & revenue & growth & growth & growth & & & & & & & & & & & & \hline

War of 1812 & 1812:6 - 1815:2 & 7.34 & -0.20 & 7.14 & -2.35 & 10.60 & 0.00 & -0.16 & 0.06 & -1.01 & -32.9 & 148.5 & 0.0 & -2.2 & 0.8 & -14.2 & \\

Civil War (Union) & 1861:4 - 1865:4 & 31.04 & 2.10 & 33.14 & 2.26 & 19.74 & 6.49 & 1.08 & 3.95 & -0.37 & 6.8 & 59.6 & 19.6 & 3.2 & 11.9 & -1.1 \\

\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{Decomposition of Wartime Revenue: War of 1812 and the Civil War}
\end{table}

For each war, the elements in first row are percents of GDP. Columns (4)-(9) sum to column (3). The numbers in the second row are percentages of the sum of war-related government spending and returns to bondholders (column (3)) accounted for by each term in (4)-(9).

Peacetime baseline is the average value five years prior to the war.
be paid in gold or in greenbacks because prices denominated in greenbacks doubled during the Civil War. While they receded enough from 1865 to 1879 that by 1879 the U.S. could resume specie payments, de facto making the greenbacks warehouse certificates for a set quantity of gold, before the election of President Grant in November 1868, there was widespread doubt and debate about whether the principal owed to owners of 5-20’s was due in paper or in gold. In June 1868, the 5-20’s comprised 70.5% of the interest-bearing debt and gold was trading at a 40% premium.

The creation of the legal tender notes also created two types of debts: those promising to pay “lawful money” (i.e., greenbacks) and those promising to pay “coin” (i.e., gold). At its peak in September 1865, debt promising to pay in “lawful money” comprised over 54% of outstanding debt. During the war of independence, the unit of account had been specie (Spanish dollars) and the paper money (the Continental currency) traded at a discount. However, from 1862 to 1879 prices for both goods and bonds (including those that promised to pay in coin) were quoted in “lawful money” (i.e., greenbacks) and gold dollars sold at a premium.

3.3.1 Rationalizing the 5-20’s

We interpret the government’s decision to issue 5-20’s in the first place as indicating policy makers’ wish to implement policies that would promote lower future interest rates on government debt. The 5-20’s had a par value of 100, promised 6% coupons each year, matured after twenty years, and were callable at par at the governments’ discretion after 5 years. Wanting to raise large amounts, why would the Union sell a bond that involved simultaneously purchasing a call option?

To understand the government’s decision to issue 5-20’s, it helps to posit heterogenous beliefs about future interest rates. If Union fiscal authorities imputed to most market participants different views about the likely future path of interest rates than theirs, then the call options associated with the 5-20’s would have been a good buy for the Union government. Also, by buying a call option, the Union fiscal authorities could indicate to the market their intention to pursue continuation policies that would drive future interest rates lower than those forecast by the market, thereby rendering the call option more valuable than the market might otherwise have thought.

A persistent theme in US policy circles has been how to reduce interest paid on U.S. government debt. Both sides of the late 1860s debate about whether to repay the principal on the 5-20’s in paper or in gold could claim to advocate policies in the tradition of our first Secretary of Treasury. Hamilton (1790) had asserted that by restructuring the U.S. debt as he had recommended, prospective interest rates on new issues of government debt would fall because default premiums would fall. But, by discriminating among government creditors, Hamilton had lowered interest rates in another sense, namely, by paying out substantially less to various classes of U.S. creditors than had originally been promised. The magic that Hamilton’s restructuring plan promised was that it would save money for U.S. taxpayers by partially defaulting on some debts,
while simultaneously promoting the prospect of lower default premiums on new and future issues of U.S. government debt. That Hamilton managed that balancing act left room for advocates of very different debt management policies to claim that they were his true followers.

Thus, the Democrats and President Andrew Johnson meant one thing when they advocated reducing interest payments on the government debt, while the Republicans and Ulysses S. Grant meant something else. The Democrats wanted to reduce interest payments ex post by paying government creditors with a depreciated currency. By paying in gold, Republicans wanted to reduce risk premia on prospective issues of Federal debt, thereby reducing interest payments ex ante.

Deciding to repay the 5-20’s in gold resulted in large real returns to bondholders. From 1869 to 1879 the real holding period returns to federal government creditors averaged 7.2% per year. Owners of the 5-20’s received an average real annual return of 8.2% over this period. However, in contrast to Hamilton’s refinancing in 1790, the high returns delivered to federal bondholders did not come at the expense of holders of paper money. Holders of non-interest-bearing “lawful money” legal tender notes and fractional currency saw the specie value of their assets appreciate through deflation. In June 1868, it took 140 greenbacks to buy 100 gold dollars. Five years later in 1873, the price had fallen to 116.5. In December 1878, greenbacks traded at par. In this way, the federal government “assumed” all of its promised obligations to holders of the greenbacks (see the above words of Calvin Coolidge). Contrast this “closing the gap” between market and par values to the persistent gap between the market and par values of the debt after Hamilton’s 1790 rescheduling, summarized in figure 8 above.

Payne et al. (2022) argue that Hamilton’s and Grant’s strategy for reducing the cost of financing US Treasury debt succeeded. Over the 19th century, yields on US Treasury securities steadily declined, with the zero-coupon 10 year-yield falling from 8% in 1800 to 2% in 1900. Further, prior to and during the Civil War, US Treasury debt traded at a premium relative to UK debt, the “safe asset” of the era, but by the 1880s this risk premium had evaporated.

### 3.4 Historical Fragment about Paying Interest on Reserves

The Fed’s policy since 2008 of paying interest on reserves, and now also on reverse repos, arose several times at the conference. Proposals to pay interest on reserves are interesting when viewed from perspectives supplied by nineteenth century US proposals. As noted above, the Framers of the US Constitution disapproved of any government’s issuing “bills of credit” resembling money, either federal or state. So for them, proposals to pay interest on paper money were moot. An originalist and strict constructionists President Andrew Jackson and his successors Martin Van Buren and James K. Polk took steps to implement a 100% reserve regime: bank reserves were to be full-bodied gold and silver coins.\(^8\) Paying nominal interest on those reserves was not on

\(^8\)See Rothbard (2002).
the table in that perfect commodity standard. But in the 19th century whenever federal or state
governments did issue paper money backed by fractional reserves, so issues about paying interest
on money really lay close to the surface. This situation provoked the shifting opinions about
exploiting gains from price discrimination among classes of government creditors that we have
described above, and in more detail in Hall and Sargent (2014).

3.5 Learning from Experience

Wartime surges in government expenditures have always provoked debates about how to pay for
them. Those debates inspired classic theoretical contributions about the optimal mix of debt
and taxes and whether the mix matters at all. The origin of theories of optimal tax-borrowing
policies in those debates is an element of our defense against a charge of inappropriate presentism
(interpreting the past from a perspective and with information not available to those who acted
in history). Statesmen who made the tax and borrowing decisions studied here had purposes and
theories in mind, intellectual forces that will be important parts of our story. Therefore, we are
naturally ambivalent about whether the theories that guide our pattern recognitions are to be
viewed as normative (how things should be) or positive (how things are). We use the theories both
ways because key historical actors sometimes used them as rationalizations of their proposals. A
poster child for this point of view is the coincidence of recommendations of the Barro (1979)
model with Secretary of Treasury Albert Gallatin’s 1807 Report as well as subsequent actions of
Gallatin and his successors.

For over two centuries, policy makers confronted their predicaments by combining their recol-
lections of histories with their theories. They repeatedly struggled against the same forces. These
include roll-over risks associated with unanticipated changes in market conditions and interest
rates that bedevil decisions about the maturity structure of debt to sell; issues about units of
account in which to denominate coupon and principal payments; interactions between banking
and fiscal policies; temptations to default; and issues forced on them by prospective government
creditors, incentives to delay supplying credit in anticipation of better terms later.

We appreciate Gary Becker (1962) view that constraints alone go a long way in explaining
patterns in outcomes, regardless of decision makers’ purposes or their rationality. When we spot
differences across patterns of wartime financings, our theories naturally direct us to ask how much
of these are to be explained by decision makers’ purposes or their constraints or their theories. Our
research in Hall and Sargent (2021) described decision makers’ evolving understandings. Thus,
memories of how the Continental currency that had financed the War of Independence from Great
Britain had eventually depreciated to one penny on the dollar convinced War of 1812 decision
makers to take steps to avoid that outcome. Non-callable Federal bonds issued to pay for the
Mexican War appreciated in value after the war when interest rates fell, creating ex post regrets
that the bonds had not been bundled with call options, something that the Union would do early
in the Civil War. As we noted in figure 7, rising prices and thus rising nominal interest rates after World War I delivered nominal capital losses to owners of the Liberty Bonds that had been used to finance the war, teaching Captain Harry Truman a lesson that he would remember when as President he insisted that the Treasury and Federal Reserve manage interest rates after World War II to prevent that from happening again. In Hall and Sargent (2021) we described many other instances of later statesmen learning from what came to be recognized as mistakes during past wars. Prevailing understandings evolved about how government securities should be designed and marketed; about types of taxes to be imposed; and about the roles of the legal restrictions such as price controls and portfolio restrictions recommended by Keynes (1940) and formalized by a theory of Bryant and Wallace (1984).

In most wars, we see evidence of Gallatin-Barro tax smoothing (i.e., taxes responding much less than one-for-one with spending), but only during the Civil War and the War of COVID-19 do we actually see a close approximation to the split between taxes and debt that the model recommends for a purely temporary expenditure surge. We also see negative wartime bond returns followed by positive postwar returns in the War of 1812, the Civil War, and World War I as prescribed by the Lucas-Stokey model. See figures 11 and 12. But as John Cochrane noted at the conference, this model directs that bondholders should receive an immediate capital loss at the outbreak of a war. To implement that Lucas-Stokey recommendation there had to be a sufficiently large outstanding stock of debt at the time of the wartime surge in government spending. As shown in figures 5 and 8, the U.S. had little debt at the start of the Civil War and World War I. Thus for these wars, the Lucas-Stokey action would not help the government’s financial situation. In various episodes, Hall and Sargent (2021) discusses how Congress and Treasury secretaries experimented and innovated with various debt designs and management policies to induce potential investors to purchase bonds early in wars despite fears of wartime capital losses.

From observations before the War on COVID-19, we think that we detected some notable patterns. As Table 4 reports, from the War of 1812 to World War II, the U.S. financed larger shares of wartime spending with taxes and smaller shares with debt. This trend did not continue for COVID-19. Seignorage contributed a significant share of revenue in the Civil War, World War I, World War II, and the War on COVID-19. Over time, post-war real returns paid to bondholders have declined. After four major wars, the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War I, and World War II, average annual returns to bondholders were 12.0%, 8.5%, 5.5%, and -1.4%, respectively.

9Statisticians tell us that the only things we can learn about are parameters of a necessarily restricted model, so perhaps it is excusable that we see successive government authorities processing information about past government expenditure surges in order to modify and refine their theories.
Figure 11: Natural Log of the Price Level During and After War of 1812, the US Civil War, World War I, and World War II

War of 1812 and Civil War: Warren-Pearson Index; WW-I and WW-II: BLS-CPI

Figure 12: Real Values of $100 Portfolio of Treasury Securities Invested at the Starts of the War of 1812, the US Civil War, World War I, and World War II
### Table 4: How US Paid for Five Wars

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>War</th>
<th>Taxes</th>
<th>Bonds</th>
<th>Money</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War of 1812</td>
<td>-32.9</td>
<td>148.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COVID-19</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As percentages of total revenues.

## 4 A Broadway Musical?

**Thomas Jefferson (standing next to James Madison):** But Hamilton forgets
His plan would have the government assume state’s debts
Now, place your bets as to who that benefits
The very seat of government where Hamilton sits:

**Alexander Hamilton:** If we assume the debts,
the Union gets new line of credit, a financial diuretic.
How do you not get it?
If we’re aggressive and competitive, the Union gets a boost.
You’d rather give it a sedative?


At the conference, Michael Bordo stressed that it mattered that the US was on a limping gold-exchange standard during World Wars I and II, while during COVID-19, links of the US dollar to gold had been completely severed. An important aspect of our account of pre-1900 US fiscal-monetary policies was a struggle about how firmly to link various types and denominations of federal government debts to gold. Perhaps parts of our story could inspire a Broadway Musical “Madison” that rewrites a conventional wisdom encoded in the Broadway hit “Hamilton” in a way that presents a less confused Madison and a subtler Hamilton.

Thus, [Hall and Sargent (2014)] offers a provocative revisionist interpretation of the first 100 years of U.S. government finance. A conventional wisdom sees Alexander Hamilton as a paragon of financial responsibility who in 1790 promoted U.S. credit by executing an honorable and credit-enhancing rescheduling of debts incurred during the American Revolution. In doing that, Hamilton received little help from a less economically knowledgeable James Madison, who had advocated a misdirected discrimination scheme for tampering with pay outs to U.S. creditors, a scheme that
would have permanently damaged U.S. credit. But if we judge Hamilton and Madison by the actions over which they presided, a different picture emerges.

It was Hamilton who presided over widespread discriminations and repudiations, though perhaps he repudiated less than had been expected during the 1780s, undoubtedly earning him substantial gratitude from 1780s speculators in some U.S. and state debts, but not in others (purchasers of those forlorn Continentals). It was James Madison who during the War of 1812 presided over an administration that declined to make short-term U.S. debt a legal tender and, at the end of the war, awarded positive returns to holders of short-term U.S. debt. Despite considerable difficulty in selling interest-bearing debt, in financing the War of 1812 the U.S. government refrained from using that mainstay of government finance during the American Revolution, the inflation tax. That established precedents that influenced how Ulysses S. Grant and the Republican party chose to complete Union policy for financing the Civil War. Andrew Johnson and other late 1860s advocates of ex post lowering interest payments to Union creditors could have appealed to Alexander Hamilton’s discriminatory haircuts as antecedents; but they wanted to repudiate the precedent set by the high returns paid out by the Madison administration and its immediate successors.

Of course, our revisionist history omits as much as it includes. The Madison administration faced different constraints and opportunities than did the Washington-Hamilton administration in 1790. The U.S. was bigger and wealthier in 1812. And as a result of how markets interpreted what Washington and Hamilton had done, the U.S. in 1812 faced reputations vis a vis its prospective creditors that differed from those that had confronted the Washington administration in 1790.

More generally, from the observations that we have surveyed here we can gather five enduring lessons:

1. The ability of a government to borrow today depends on expectations about future tax revenues.
2. Free-rider problems exist for subordinate governments vis-a-vis a central government.
3. Good reputations can be costly to acquire.
4. Sometimes, it can help to sustain distinct reputations with different parties.
5. Confused monetary-fiscal coordination creates costly uncertainties.

References


10Versions of these lessons were also stated in Sargent (2012, pp. 3-4).


